Abstract: This article serves to identify the flaws in the three-pronged solution to the orphan works problem implemented in the UK. It concurrently questions the compatibility of the UK's approach with the objectives sought to be achieved by the legislation; namely to ensure legal certainty with respect to the use of orphan works, to facilitate cross-border access to orphan works, to facilitate mass digitisation projects and to ensure that authors' moral rights remain respected and protected. In addressing these issues, the article seeks to highlight aspects of the UK solution which could be amended in order to ensure that copyright law remains relevant and workable in the digital age, whilst maintaining a fair balance between protecting the interests of right holders and the public.
A. INTRODUCTION
Orphan works, defined as 'works … protected by copyright … for which no right holder has been identified, or, if identified, has not been located', represent a significant barrier to the establishment of comprehensive digital libraries and databases. 1 Mass digitisation projects such as the Google Books Library and Europeana (a pan-European digital archive intended to facilitate the sharing of European cultural heritage) have been drastically hindered by the fact that copyright clearance could not be obtained for works whose authors could not be located.
Even where such clearance could, theoretically, be secured through lengthy and costly search procedures, the transaction cost of such procedures often far exceeds the cost of digitising the material, resulting in market inefficiency.
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Organisational reluctance to initiate potentially fruitless and costly searches or, alternatively, to use works without authorisation and assume the risk of liability for copyright infringement, has resulted in 'many works l [ying] unused that could create great value'.
3 Indeed, the value that these works could create is not limited to financial value. They offer Section B will explain why reverting to a system of copyright registration would be undesirable and will highlight the need for a novel solution to the orphan works problem.
Section C will outline the current level of legislative intervention with regard to orphan works in the UK. Section D will question the degree of legal certainty it affords to potential users of orphan works. Section E will consider the ability of this legislation to facilitate cross-border access and mass digitisation efforts. Section F will assess its compliance with existing legal requirements. Section G will consider the respect and protection it affords to moral rights. The paper will conclude with a summary of its findings.
B. THE NEED FOR A NOVEL SOLUTION
Many attribute the emergence of the orphan works problem to the Berne Convention's prohibition on mandatory formalities as a condition for the 'enjoyment … and exercise' of copyright. 10 They call for the re-imposition of such formalities in the form of a mandatory registration requirement. 11 This course of action, however, is unlikely to eliminate the problem. 12 Whilst a registration requirement may ensure that only works intended to be exploited by their authors are protected by copyright, and would provide contact details for future potential users to seek licensing permissions, re-imposing such a formality would be impractical in 'the digital age'. 13 The emergence of digital communication technologies has minimised publication and distribution costs, enabling many more individuals to become authors of copyrightable works. 14 As Greenberg observes, requiring a blogger to register for copyright protection in respect of each of the multiple blog posts he might make on a daily basis would be prohibitively expensive. 15 In many cases, that blogger will be unable to predict with accuracy which of his works are likely to be commercially successful and worth expending the effort required to gain copyright protection. 16 A register would also need to be updated following any transfers of intellectual property rights, if it were to be of real assistance to prospective users of orphan works. Such a registration requirement could actually discourage the creation of expressive works. Complying with a registration requirement would impose considerable costs upon serial creators, on top of the time and money initially expended in creating their works. It is likely to be more economically viable and require less time, money and effort for individuals to exploit existing unprotected works than to create and seek protection for their own. 18 Thus, the problem of inaccessible works would merely be replaced with one of a dearth of creative works altogether. A novel solution, rather than a reversion in copyright policy, is required to resolve the orphan works problem.
C. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM
The orphan works problem in the UK has been tackled using a three-pronged approach. The first prong consists of a narrowly circumscribed orphan works exception to the exclusive rights of reproduction and making available. This was introduced at EU level by the OWD, and has been implemented in the UK by the Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted
Uses of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014 (hereinafter CPUO Regulations). 19 The regulations permit certain 'relevant bod[ies]' to reproduce orphan works for particular purposes and make them available, insofar as the use is in pursuit of a public interest mission. 20 The orphan status of a work must be established by way of a diligent search before it may be used under this exception. 21 The regulations set out mandatory sources to be consulted in the course of each diligent search, and list further relevant sources to be consulted for different categories of work. 22 'Fair compensation' will be payable to reappearing rightholders for the use of their work(s) under the exception. 23 The regulations also explicitly recognise the principle of mutual recognition set out in the OWD. 24 Under this principle, works in respect of which a qualifying diligent search has been conducted will be automatically recognised as orphans in every EU is also unclear whether the public or private nature of an institution is a relevant factor to be considered.
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Questions also arise regarding the definition of 'relevant works'. 42 The CPUO Regulations suggest that only certain types of work held in the collections of certain beneficiary institutions will constitute relevant works. Section 2(2)(a) indicates that 'a work in the form of a book, journal, newspaper, magazine or other writing' will only be deemed 'relevant' where it is contained in the collection of a 'publicly accessible library, educational establishment, museum, archive or film or audio heritage institution'. It is not clear whether the reference to 'other writings' is intended to refer only to classic forms of literary work akin to those enumerated, or also to more modern forms such as computer programmes and source codes. Secondly, it is extremely difficult for prospective users of orphan works to know whether certain obligations imposed upon them by the regulations have been fulfilled. Though the regulations require that a diligent search be conducted to determine the orphan status of a work, and set out relevant sources to be consulted for each category of relevant work, they fail to specify whether consulting each of the specified sources will automatically guarantee operation of the exception. The regulations also require that consultation of these sources be conducted either in the Member State in which the work was first published or broadcast, or the Member State in which the organisation that first made the work available with the consent of the rightholders is established.
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Given that the information potential users have about orphan works and their owners is necessarily limited, it will not be easy to determine whether a work is protected by copyright and has been published or broadcast, let alone to determine in which Member State this may have occurred. Indeed, no independent body is appointed to verify the diligence of a search. The degree of ambiguity evident in the CPUO Regulations is particularly concerning,
given that beneficiary institutions in pursuit of a 'public interest mission' are likely to have limited funds with which to secure sophisticated legal advice.
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Regrettably, the system of individual licensing detailed in the LOW Regulations reflects a number of the same uncertainties which plague the CPUO Regulations. The LOW Regulations also fail to implement a statutory obligation on listed institutions to respond to diligent search requests, and to clarify how a reappearing rightholder is to 'satisfy the authorising body…of Secondly, uncertainty stems from the conflicting conceptions of a 'relevant work' in sections 3(1) and 3(6). While section 3(1) defines a relevant work as 'a work protected by copyright or a performance in respect of which certain acts constitute restricted acts', section 3(6) refers to relevant work[s] 'in which it is not known whether copyright or the right to permit or prohibit the restricted act subsists'. 55 The inconsistency between the two regulations leaves prospective users unclear as to whether copyright protection is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining an orphan licence. If it is, similar difficulties in confirming the existence of such copyright protection arise as under the CPUO Regulations.
Thirdly, the broad discretion afforded to the authorising body under section 6(5)(b) to refuse to grant licences 'on any…reasonable ground' is likely to cause uncertainty amongst prospective users as to whether they are likely to be granted an orphan works licence. the prevalence of the organisational 'risk managed' mentality, such uncertainty may discourage prospective users of orphan works from assuming the cost of diligent searches. who have not opted out, on behalf of whom relevant licensing bodies are authorised to grant extended collective licences. Even if 'a significant number' simply intended to mean a number of rightholders that is not insignificant, relevant licensing bodies will still be able to show that they are sufficiently representative without involving orphan rightholders. This task would, in fact, be easier than if 'significant' was intended to refer to a majority.
In light of this analysis, it is unfortunate that the Intellectual Property Office has expressed the aforementioned doubts regarding the applicability of the extended collective licensing scheme to orphan works. These are likely to confuse prospective users of orphan works as to the licensing options available to them. Expressing such doubts is even more regrettable when one takes into consideration the fact that seeking an extended collective licence is a much more attractive option for prospective users of orphan works than that provided by either the CPUO or LOW Regulations. Though relevant licensing bodies are obliged under section 18(3) of the ECL Regulations to 'distribute the appropriate portion of the net licence fee to those non-member rightholders who have been identified and located', no guidance is provided as to the standard of search required to identify and locate such rightholders. Therefore, it is estimated that the expected standard of search would fall below the 'diligent search' standard required by the LOW Regulations. Whatever the required standard of search, responsibility for meeting it is transferred from the prospective user to the relevant licensing body. Thus, by obtaining an extended collective licence to use orphan works, users could avoid expending time, effort and money in conducting potentially fruitless diligent searches.
E. FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER ACCESS AND MASS DIGITISATION
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Had the OWD lived up to its title as an instrument fit to 'remove market fragmentation and provide a legal framework that favours EU competitiveness', the transposing CPUO
Regulations could have played a small part in harmonising the approach of all EU Member
States with respect to orphan works. 59 If this approach had been harmonised, cross-border operations involving the use of orphan works in the EU could have been made simpler and cheaper. Corporations operating across a number of EU countries could have significantly reduced the regulatory cost involved in complying with differing national licensing and diligent search requirements. Those involved in mass digitisation initiatives could have similarly benefitted. Regrettably, the OWD has failed to realise these potential benefits. In providing for an extremely limited exception available only to a restricted list of institutions, and in stating that it operates without prejudice to national systems of rights management, the OWD invites the establishment of additional, potentially conflicting, national regimes. In effect, it actively discourages any potentially harmonising effect. As Rosati submits, where Member States 59 Janssens and Tryggvadóttir (n 41) 4.
remain free to select their own regulatory approach to orphan works, there is 'no room for the creation of an EU level playing field'.
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This broad discretion afforded to Member States fails to address the existing difficulties faced by those involved in mass online digitisation projects. Given the territorial nature of intellectual property rights, the legality of making works available on the internet tends to be judged according to the laws of each country in which they are made available. 61 Therefore, the greater the variations in approach to orphan rights management across different jurisdictions, the more costly and difficult it is to ensure that one's use of an orphan work online complies with every system. licensing system in addition to the exception. Indeed, mutual recognition does not account for the fact that differences in national copyright law may mean that a work which is orphaned in one jurisdiction is not orphaned in another. 65 For example, Dutch copyright law dictates that an employer owns all rights in works created by his employees in the course of their employment. 66 Under German copyright law, however, the rights vest in the employeecreator. 67 An inability to locate the employer following a diligent search would result in the work being deemed an orphan work under Dutch law, but would have no bearing on the status of the work under German law.
The fact that the orphan works exception applies only to certain institutions pursuing public interest missions operates as a further barrier to mass digitisation efforts. With commercial operations excluded from its scope, the exception is wholly unsuited to facilitating the use of orphan works in commercial mass digitisation initiatives such as the Google Books
Library. Even non-commercial initiatives are likely to be significantly hindered by the fact that stand-alone photographs and images are excluded from the scope of the exception.
Undoubtedly, images could add a great deal to a 'repository of cultural heritage' such as Europeana. 68 Their exclusion appears particularly anomalous in light of the fact that photographs tend to bear less identifying information than other kinds of work, and therefore are significantly more susceptible to orphanage. 69 In addition, fulfilling the requirement that a diligent search be conducted in respect of each orphan work intended to be used under the exception 'may be prohibitively costly' in the context of mass digitisation. 70 The fact that section 5(8) requires consultation of sources of information 'in other countries', where there is evidence to suggest that relevant information on rightholders is to be found there, and is not limited to other European countries, increases the likelihood that carrying out multiple diligent searches will be prohibitively costly.
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While the licensing scheme provided for by the LOW Regulations is available to both commercial and non-commercial users, the fact that it also requires a diligent search for each orphan work renders it similarly unsuited to facilitating the use of orphan works in mass digitisation initiatives.
In addition, the regulations facilitate cross-border access to orphan works only to a Though technological protection measures such as geo-blockers may be used to restrict access to orphan materials to solely UK-based users, the premise behind mass digitisation projects is that they facilitate the sharing of information on a large scale. It is highly improbable that the goal shared by both Europeana and the Google Books Library to 'democratize access to the world's collective knowledge' could be achieved through disseminating materials online in only one country. 73 Furthermore, as Savvides and Pollard note, technological protection measures are costly and time-consuming to operate, and require regular updating to keep pace with technological advances. 74 They also operate 'blind', in the sense that they are unable to discern whether a user is about to make a lawful or unlawful use of a work.
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Having to pay a licence fee prior to the use of individual orphan works also hinders the number of orphan works that may be used in mass digitisation projects. Licence fee payments eat away at the finite financial resources backing mass digitisation initiatives. Evidently, the more licence fees that must be paid, the fewer orphan works that may be used. rightholders, rather than upfront. Given that rightholders are unlikely to reappear in the majority of cases, prospective users could retain fees which would otherwise be used to fund arbitrary 'social, cultural and educational activities' and make greater use of orphan works. 
F. COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
As a signatory of the Berne Convention, the UK legislature is bound by the prohibition in In the event that the Information Society Directive is suitably amended, and the orphan works exception is added to its exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations, the exception, as implemented at by the CPUO Regulations, will still have to pass the three-step test to be in full compliance with EU law.
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According to the first step of the test, the exception must be confined to a 'certain special case'. 84 The WTO panel, in applying the test, has clarified that 'certain' is intended to mean 'clearly defined', and that 'special' is intended to mean 'narrow in scope and reach'.
85
Despite Kerremans' dismissal of this first prong as a mere 'tautology', as 'an exception always entails a special case which differs from the general rule', the fact that courts regularly apply the full test in order to determine the validity of national exceptions indicates that compliance cannot always be assumed. 86 Academic literature reveals conflicting views as to whether the orphan works exception would constitute a special case. While Schulze opines that a class of works whose authors cannot be located would be too wide to constitute a special case, Bronder takes the opposite stance. 87 However, given that the group of users intended to avail of this particular exception is limited to certain institutions in pursuit of a public-interest, rather than just any individual who cannot locate the owner of the work, it is suggested that the exception is both clearly defined and narrow in scope and reach.
According to the second step of the test, the exception must not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work. 88 It has been argued that the use of works under the orphan works exception would not pose problems under this step of the test. Because the owners of the orphan works are not extracting economic value from them, it is argued that there is no 'normal exploitation'. 89 This approach is mirrored by the WTO panel's focus on income-generating forms of exploitation. 90 This interpretation of the second step of the test, it is argued, is unduly blinkered. It presumes that exploitation necessarily equates with financial reward, and fails to account for non-financial forms of exploitation. To 'exploit' is to 'make full use of and derive benefit from a resource'. 91 Conceivably, an orphan work owner could be considered to be 'making full use' of his work by exercising his choice not to grant licences for its use. He could also be said to be deriving benefit, or at least avoiding potential harm, by choosing not to publicly disclose a work containing information which might tarnish his honour and reputation.
In support of this argument, it has been noted that deeming a failure to extract economic value from one's work to be a failure to 'normal[ly] exploit the work' could have the effect of depriving locatable authors of control over exploitations of their work, if they declined to authorise certain uses. 92 This reasoning may be squared with the narrow interpretation of 'conflict with the normal exploitation of the work' adopted by the Advocate General in the Infopaq decision.
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In this case, it was held that the provision of newspaper extracts containing search terms that had been inputted into a search engine conflicted with the normal exploitation of the work under the three-step test. It was held that making these extracts available was likely to have some impact on full newspaper sales. This impact could not have been expected to be significant, as individuals are unlikely to view short, out-of-context newspaper extracts as acceptable substitutes for full newspapers. Therefore, the implication is that the prospect of even a meagre loss of sales may be sufficient for an exception to fail the second prong of the three-step test. If, applying the reasoning in the previous paragraph, it is possible to 'normally exploit' one's works by choosing not to make them available to the public, in the interests of maintaining one's reputation, then it follows that the prospect of even a small amount of damage to that reputation could also result in failure to satisfy the test.
The third step of the test requires that the exception must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 94 In Wilson's view, it is unlikely that any orphan works exception would satisfy this requirement. 95 She believes that this is because orphan work rightholders are not given an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the exploitation of their works, often because they are unaware of any exploitation. 96 Thus, she considers that the interests of the author of an orphan work would be 'unreasonably prejudiced' once his work is used without his permission. 97 However, this argument fails to account for the fact that rightholders are unlikely to be aware that their works are being exploited when they are used under any exception, whether they are locatable or not. Exceptions, by their nature, allow for deviations from the exclusive rights of exploitation afforded to rightholders under copyright law. Permission is not required to be sought from rightholders in order to make use of their copyrighted works under an exception, nor are rightholders required to be put on notice of such use. 98 The fact that a rightholder is 'locatable' does not necessarily mean that he is more likely to discover that his work is being used under an exception. it, build media hype, and thus secure greater commercial reward. Alternatively, he may have decided that the work needed to be rewritten or reformulated before it was ready to be publicly released.
For this reason, Bronder suggests that the most cautious approach for introducing an orphan works exception would be to exclude unpublished and undisclosed works from its remit. 99 The CPUO Regulations have adopted this cautious approach in stating that the exception applies only to works which have been published, broadcast or made publicly accessible. The CPUO Regulations also provide for remuneration in the form of 'fair compensation', which the WTO Panel believes may 'convert an unreasonable prejudice into a reasonable one'. 100 The orphan works exception seems, therefore, to satisfy this third step of the three-step test.
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Given that the three-step test is only intended to apply to exceptions and limitations to rightholders' exclusive rights, it would appear, prima facie, that licences should not fall within its remit. Arguably, however, this will not be the case where the effect of the licence is In light of the previous analysis of the meaning of the 'normal exploitation of the work', and the conclusion that it encompasses non-financial forms of exploitation, including purposely withholding one's work from the public sphere, it appears that the licensing system under the LOW Regulations would also fail the second step of the test. If the rightholder in an orphan work prefers to 'exploit' said work by keeping it undisclosed, then a licence permitting 'any acts restricted by the copyright' must necessarily interfere with the rightholder's desired form of exploitation.
Turning to the third step of the test, the fact that orphan works subject to the licensing scheme under the LOW Regulations are not limited to those which are published or have been made available is likely to result in unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the 101 Rosati (n 60) 21.
rightholder. In failing to exclude works that have not been published or made available, the LOW Regulations disregard the cautious approach recommended by Bronder and adopted by the OWD and CPUO Regulations. 102 This may result in particularly undesirable consequences for rightholders. In light of the afore-discussed reasons why a rightholder might consciously delay or decline to disclose his work, such consequences could amount to reputational damage, or reduction in revenues in the event of future financial exploitation of the work.
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Given that extended collective licences, like licences granted under the LOW Regulations, operate as de facto exceptions, it is submitted that they, too, are subject to the requirements of the three-step test. Despite the fact that the Satellite and Cable Directive has endorsed the applicability of the extended collective licensing model in certain circumstances, and that the Information Society Directive is without prejudice to agreements in Member States concerning the management of rights such as extended collective licensing, this should not be taken to guarantee that its application will always be fully compliant with international legal requirements.
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Though there is no explicit restriction on the types of copyright-protected work and uses in respect of which extended collective licences may be granted, such licences will only be available in respect of works and uses represented by an authorised 'relevant licensing body'. 104 Individual licensing bodies will only be authorised to issue extended collective licences for specific uses of specific kinds of work. As Riis and Schovsbo observe, an assessment of whether extended collective licensing schemes constitute 'certain special cases'
should, therefore, consider individual schemes rather than the aggregate number permitted under a particular set of regulations. 105 Conducting an assessment of licensing schemes in the aggregate could lead to anomalous results, particularly under the first step of the test. There would necessarily come a point where the authorisation of another scheme would cast the 'exception' beyond the bounds of a certain special case. This would not allow for consideration of the nature of the uses and works covered by the scheme at the tipping point, which may have been extremely limited in scope. Given that the regulations have only recently been introduced, the scope of the respective extended collective licensing schemes authorised thereunder remains to be seen.
Just as under the LOW Regulations, however, the category of potential beneficiaries entitled to apply for extended collective licences is unlimited. In addition, because the ECL Regulations are not specifically intended to tackle the orphan works problem, they do not require applicants for licences to undertake any form of diligent search as a prerequisite to being granted a licence. It is unlikely, therefore, that extended collective licences granted under the regulations would be deemed sufficiently clearly defined and narrow in scope and reach to satisfy the first prong of the test, regardless of how limited the class of works and permitted uses.
This said, a number of academics have argued that the extended collective licensing systems for copyright which are commonplace in Nordic countries would satisfy the second step of the test. 106 Far from conflicting with the normal exploitation of copyright works, they suggest that, in these countries, having a large portion of copyrights and related rights administered by way of extended collective licence is itself a form of normal exploitation. Even if this were the case, however, it is far from clear that extended collective licensing could be considered a form of 'normal exploitation' of copyright works in the UK. Such systems have been in place in Nordic countries since the 1960s, whereas they have only recently been introduced in the UK. 107 In the event that this form of licensing does become accepted and popular in the UK, it is unclear at exactly what point it shifts from being an abnormal form of exploitation to a normal form. Given that collective rights management is 'still rather underdeveloped … in the photographic and audiovisual fields', however, it must be assumed that this shifting process will be slow.
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Indeed, this raises an interesting question over the correct interpretation of the second step of the test where two forms of 'normal exploitation' conflict. Assuming that there are many ways in which a work may be exploited, and that both exploitation under an extended collective licence and non-financial exploitation through conscious non-disclosure of one's work constitute forms of normal exploitation, it is clear that the two are not fully compatible.
Although a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is conceivable that each might render the other non-compliant with the second step of the test.
Moving on to consider the third step of the test, the ECL Regulations -like the LOW only that the arrangements should be 'appropriate for the proposed scheme, having regard to the interests of non-member rightholders'. 112 The fact that administration fees deducted by the licensing body must be 'reasonable' suggests that high notification and distribution costs for rightholders in foreign jurisdictions may not be covered, and it is therefore less likely that they will receive the remuneration to which they are entitled. This indicates that the prohibition on formalities extends beyond the grant of rights, to the use and enjoyment of those rights that have been granted. Given that copyright protection vests automatically in original works which are recorded in material form, it certainly appears that having to fill out and issue an 'opt-out notice' in order to prevent one's work from being licensed out against one's will would affect the enjoyment and exercise of exclusive rights under copyright law. 116 Finally, it must be noted that the provisions of both the ECL and LOW Regulations also risk undermining the principle of subsidiarity. 117 As, under Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Commission and European Member States share competence with respect to intellectual property law, both are authorised to adopt binding legislative acts in this field. 118 According to Article 2, however, this is subject to the caveat that Member States may only exercise their legislative competence insofar as the EU has 'not exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence'.
Because the EU has legislated in the OWD for an exception to copyright for certain uses of orphan works by certain beneficiary organisations, Member States are forbidden under Article 4 from usurping this exercise of legislative competence. They cannot legislate in a manner that undermines the exception. However, in enacting the ERRA, and the LOW and ECL Regulations thereunder, the UK appears to have done just that. Despite the fact that a licence fee must be paid in order to obtain a licence under the LOW Regulations, which is not required upfront to avail of the orphan works exception, licences granted under the LOW Regulations are likely to be much more attractive to prospective users of orphan works. 119 Users can be certain that they will not incur liability for copyright infringement by using an orphan work when operating under a licence, whereas they cannot be so certain that their actions fall within the scope of the orphan works exception. Licences granted under the ECL Regulations offer an even more attractive solution for prospective users of orphan works, as they do not require any form of diligent search.
Evidently, licences under both the LOW and ECL Regulations may be granted to the same institutions intended to benefit from the orphan works exception, and in respect of the same type of works and uses covered by the exception, whilst offering a greater degree of legal certainty. Therefore, it appears that the regulations impermissibly supersede the provisions of the OWD, as transposed in the UK by the CPUO Regulations.
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G. PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS
The potential for infringement of moral rights also arises where orphan works are used under any of the models discussed. However, the dearth of academic literature on this topic suggests that moral rights protection has been overshadowed by the goal of 'free[ing] orphan works'.
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The ECL Regulations do not refer to moral rights at all, and, though the LOW and CPUO Regulations purport to offer some protection of the moral rights of authors, this protection appears to be more tokenistic than substantive.
While the failure to properly address moral rights protection in the UK regulations is unsurprising, given the traditional British 'scepticism towards claims that authors deserve special protection in law', the UK remains obliged, under EU law, to protect such rights.
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Authors' rights of attribution (encompassing the right to object to false attribution) and integrity are explicitly recognised by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, and provision for safeguarding those rights must be made at national level. These rights may be waived, but are typically non-assignable. 
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The CPUO Regulations state that for an orphan work to be used under the exception, it must be 'reasonable to assume that the rightholders would not oppose the use of the work'. 124 This appears to hint at the right of integrity. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the individual 'protected' is the rightholder, rather than the author. Moral rights are intended to protect the author of a work, and it is not guaranteed that the author and rightholder will be one and the same. Indeed, a determination of how reasonable it is to assume that a rightholder or author would not oppose use of the work necessarily requires some degree of information about that individual and how he intends the work to be perceived. The regulations also hint at the right of attribution by requiring that, in the course of the permitted use, the relevant body 'acknowledge the name of any author or other rightholder in the work who has been identified'. 125 Because no allowance is made for protecting the author's right of integrity, however, it may be the case that including the author's name on a particularly derogatory use of the material could cause more harm than good to his reputation.
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The LOW Regulations, also hinting at protection of the right of integrity, state that the relevant licensing body may refuse to grant an extended collective licence 'on the ground that, in its reasonable opinion, a proposed use or adaptation is not appropriate…[or] constitutes derogatory treatment of the work'. 126 However, the fact that the licensing body may refuse to grant a licence on such grounds indicates that it is not obliged to. Because licensing bodies justify their existence by granting licences, they do not have an interest in being unduly deferential to the interests of authors by rejecting 'derogatory' uses. It is, therefore, unlikely that the moral right of integrity would be adequately protected.
In any case, it is not clear why a licensing body should be in a position to determine whether or not a use or adaptation is inappropriate or derogatory. Despite the fact that UK courts have tended to favour an objective rather than subjective approach to the determination of whether use of a work is derogatory, and therefore prejudicial to the honour and reputation of the author, it is, appropriately, a judicial determination. 127 The LOW Regulations also state that orphan licences granted by the authorising body must 'provide that the use of an orphan work does not affect the moral rights of an author'. 128 This provision has the effect of absolving users from liability for the infringement of moral rights. Thus, licensees are afforded free rein to use orphan works without considering whether their use would be likely to affect the moral rights of the author.
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The ECL regulations contain no explicit recognition that the licensing of rights in works on behalf of others might give rise to infringement of moral rights, and contain no safeguards to prevent this occurring. The failure of the UK's three-pronged orphan works solution to consider moral rights is particularly concerning for two reasons. First, the development of technology has opened up a myriad of ways in which moral rights may be infringed. Poor quality digital display, watermarking, copying and pasting alongside other materials, and embedding links in digitised copies of works may all affect the moral right of integrity. 129 In addition, digital works are easily stripped of metadata which could attribute them to a particular author. 130 Secondly, the fact that the UK regulations provide only for pecuniary, and not injunctive, relief for reappearing rightholders means that such rightholders may be unable to put a stop to uses they know are likely to infringe the author's right of integrity. The CPUO Regulations merely provide that reappearing rightholders must be provided with fair compensation for use of the work. 131 The LOW Regulations, in addition to providing for payment of a licence fee, state that orphan licences 'shall continue for the remainder of their unexpired term, or until the expiration of the notice period … notwithstanding the fact that the rightholder is identified'. 132 The legality of this provision is particularly questionable in light of the fact that the reappearance of rightholders necessarily puts an end to the orphan status of the work. Because the regulations only permit the issuance of licences in respect of orphan works, the legal basis for such licences falls away when works are no longer orphans. A similar question arises in respect of the ECL Regulations. Section 16(4)(b) states that, even if a nonmember rightholder attempts to opt-out of the system, licences already granted in respect of that rightholder's work(s) will remain valid until their termination dates. However, the fact that opting out enables rightholders to 'exclude or limit the grant of licences under an extended collective licensing scheme in relation to their rights in a relevant work' would appear also to remove the legal basis for the continued validity of extended collective licences issued in respect of those works.
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H. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the three-pronged solution to the orphan works problem which has been implemented in the UK does not fully align with the objectives sought to be achieved.
First, it does not generate sufficient legal certainty for prospective users of orphan works. The CPUO Regulations contain a number of poorly defined terms, impose obligations upon users which they cannot confirm have been suitably fulfilled and provide no guidance regarding the appropriate course of action for users where foreseeable difficulties arise. The LOW Regulations also contain a number of poorly defined terms and, by affording broad discretion to the relevant licensing body to refuse to grant extended collective licences on 'reasonable grounds', leave users uncertain as to whether they are likely to be granted a licence following a diligent search. Though the ECL regulations appear to offer more legal certainty to prospective users, this has been undermined by a statement by the Intellectual Property
Office to the effect that it is not intended for the licensing of orphan works.
Secondly, the solution is limited in its ability to facilitate cross-border access to orphan works and their use in the context of mass digitisation. The orphan works exception implemented by the CPUO Regulations is extremely narrow in scope, and represents just one of a number of ways that the OWD exception may be interpreted by European Member States.
The harmonising effect of the principle of mutual recognition must not be overstated, considering existing differences between national copyright laws. Indeed, those seeking to use orphan works for the purposes of mass digitisation are likely to be unable to avail of the exception, considering the prohibitive cost of carrying out a diligent search in respect of each work, and the fact that commercial uses are excluded from its scope. Even non-commercial mass digitisation initiatives will be hindered by the fact that stand-alone photographs are not covered by the exception. Though the licensing systems implemented by both the LOW and ECL Regulations are less restricted in scope, the fact that licences issued under both systems are valid only within the UK negates any possibility of disseminating orphan works online. The LOW Regulations also require a diligent search in respect of each work, which, as noted, would be prohibitively expensive on a mass scale.
Thirdly, each prong of the solution appears to conflict, in some way, with international legal obligations. No aspect of the solution complies fully with each step of the three-step test.
The system for opting-out of extended collective licensing schemes under the ECL Regulations also appears to constitute a forbidden formality under the Berne Convention. Furthermore, both the LOW and ECL Regulations risk undermining the principle of subsidiarity.
Fourthly, moral rights do not appear to be sufficiently protected by the solution. The half-hearted 'protections' for moral rights included in the CPUO and LOW Regulations appear more tokenistic than substantive, and the ECL Regulations provide no safeguards at all in this regard.
The UK's legislative response to the orphan works problem combines the weaknesses of three different approaches. Although each of these approaches also has attendant strengths, this paper argues that the system, as a whole, fails to fully realise a number of stated objectives.
It is hoped that the paper has served to identify aspects of this system which require amendment or revision to more properly meet these objectives. In executing such amendments and revisions, however, the need to maintain a balance 'between the rights of the authors, on the one hand, and the interest of the public in access to protected works, on the other' must not be overlooked. 
